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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BREITLING BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION INC. )
Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.
UTAH GOLDEN SPIKERS, INC. and
THE STATE OF UTAH
Defendants-Appellant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 15945

REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
STATE OF UTAH

I.

There was no contract awarded.

One of the primary

issues in this lawsuit is whether a "contract was awaFded"
by the State of Utah to the Golden Spikers, Inc., as contemplated by the bonding statute.

Plaintiff's brief does not

accurately reflect the record on this important point.

On

pages 3 and 4 of Plaintiff's Brief, purporting to be a statement of the facts, Plaintiff infers there was a contract entered
into between the State of Utah and the Golden Spikers.

On

page 11 of Plaintiff-Respondent's Brief, he states:
"Plaintiff-Respondent submits that the facts involved
in this case clearly show that the State of Utah awarded
to the Golden Spikers a contract to install improvements at the State Fair Grounds ... "
"The terms of the agreement betwePn th~ St~te of Utah and
the Golden Spikers are clearly established by the conduct of the State of Utah and the Memorandum of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Again, on page 12 of Plaintiff's brief, Plaintiff claims
" ... an express agreement was reached between the State of Utah
and the Golden Spikers wereby the Golden Spikers were awarded
a contract to install the soccer field at the State Fair
grounds."

Plaintiff's statements are simply not true and are

not borne out by the evidence or the Findings of the Court.
a.

Exhibit 1-P not admitted as contract binding State.

Exhibit l-P, which is the unsigned agreement to which
Plaintiff refers as setting forth the terms of the agreement
was admitted by the Court for a very limited purpose only, in
the following terms:
"The Court: I thought about 1-P during the noon hour.
am going to receive it but not as a contract binding the
State to anything.
Just as a document prepared during
the course of negotiations between the parties here, but
for that purpose only.
Whatever it does or whatever it
shows that is relevant and material to resolving this
lawsuit, so be it.
I certainly don't think you have
established it is a contract signed by the Golden Spikers
and the State, but I will receive 1-P for the purpose of
showing what has taken place during the negotiations."
R.l69
b.

Findings state lease never agreed to.

The Findings

of Fact signed by the Judge in pertinent part state:
"3 ... Such lease agreement was never agreed to or signPd
by the Utah Golden Spikers, In~--------·
4.
Notwithstanding the lack of a completed lease agreement ...
. . . A written agreement betlveen the' De par I. men t of r:xpusJtions and the Utah Golden Spikers Inc. was n~vcr finalize
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8.
Notwithstanding the fact that a written contract had
not ever been executed between the Division of Expositions, and the Utah Golden Spikers, Inc. for lease of
the Fair grounds, ...
9. That after Plaintiff had performed the work at the
State Fair grounds several soccer games were played and
contract negotiations continued throughout the summer of
1976, between the Division of Expositions and the
Utah Golden Spikers, Inc., but a written contract was
never finalized ... "
The Court did not make a Finding that there was a contract
of any kind between the State and the Golden Spikers.
c.

Exhibit 1-P shows it was not a final agreement.

Exhibit 1-P itself shows it was intended to be signed by
both the Budget Officer and the Director of Finance of the
State of Utah as absolutely required by the applicable statutes,
63-2-1 and 62-2-2 Utah Code Ann.

That neither the Budget

Officer nor the Director of Finance signed Exhibit 1-P is
obvious from the exhibit itself.
d.

Testimony shows no agreement.

That the State never

reached an oral agreement is clear from the testimony.

When

asked to identify Exhibit 1-P, Mr. Weilenmann responded:
"Answer: It is a lease agreement that was one of many
lease agreements that we talked about entering into,
none of which were concluded. R.lll
Question by Mr. McLachlin: Now, Mr. Weilenmann, could we
characterize these documents as negotiations in preparation of this agreement that you had with the representative of the Golden Spikers.
A. Yes, in preparation for the signing of an acceptable
agreement with them.
That is not the document you
showed me.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was there another document prepared?

A. Maybe half a dozen or so, none of which was acceptable
to them."
R.ll2
And again, on cross examination of Mr. Weilenmann by Mr.
Gibbs, referring to about the time when Mr. Weilenmann signed
Exhibit 1-P:
"Q. Do you recall having a conversation at the S~ate Fair
grounds at or about the time of the signing of that
agreement by you, with reference to approval of Exhibit
1-P by the State Board of Examiners?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Will you tell the Court what that conversation was?

The Court: Well, let's lay the foundation,
Q. Do you recall who was present besides yourself, Mr.
Weilenmann?
A. Yes. Representatives of the Golden Spikers, Mr. Bringhurst, myself and I think a representative of the Attorn~
General's office ...
Q.

Would you now tell us what the conversation was?

A. Yes, I indicated that neither Mr. Bringhurst nor I have 1
authority to enter into an agreement on behalf of the
~·
State of Utah; that was required.
That would require the
approval of the :Soard of Examiners.
And that is the rei.son
I was concerned about what is number paragraph 32 in the
Exhibit; that we already had a contract for the use of
the coliseum and that we couldn't enter into another
contract until that first contract had been taken care
of.
Even if when it was taken care of, the Board of
Examiners, since it involved an active departure from
a normal procedure, would have to be approved by the
Board of Examiners.

Q.
Did you ever submit Exhibit 1-P or its original to
the Board of Examiners?
A. I am unsure as to whether any was submitted.
best of my knowledge, it was not.

To the
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Do you know whether or not the Board of Examiners
ever approved the original of Exhibit 1-P?
A,
I know the Board of Examiners never approved a contract.
Q.
Let me refer you to the next to the last paragraph
Exhibit 9, which shows a blank signature line for the
Budget officer of the State.
Did you ever submit this
original 1-P to the Budget office of the State?
A.

I never submitted it to anyone.

Q. Let me direct you to the Director of Finance, a blank
line also appears for his approving signature.
Did you
ever submit it to the Director of Finance?
A.
It was never submitted to the Director of Finance.
It is an incomplete document." R.l20
Again, on redirect examination by Mr. McLachlin, Mr.
Weilenmann testified as follows:
"Q.
Mr. Weilenmann, you have testified that the Board of
Examiners needed to approve this agreement?
A.

Yes.

Q.

lvhay is that?

A.
Because we had established a rule in the department
on the advice of the governor when I first became director of the department, that anytime there was a conflict in terms of contract, and/or in terms of expenditure
of funds, that might be required, or the acceptance of
funds that were substantial in nature, that the Board of
Examiners would approve it.
Q.
This was a policy that you had established during your
administration?
A.
No, it was a policy that Governor Rampton established
during his administration.
R.l21
Q.
Mr. Weilenmann, do you have any knowledge that the
Golden Spikers did not execute this agreement?
A.

Yes.
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A. Yes, because it would have been my responsibility to
take the executed copy before the Board of Examiners
which was never done.
Q.
At least you were never supplied with an executed
copy; is that correct?

A.
It was my responsibility to take it and I was never
supplied with such a copy.
Q.
Is that the reason you did not submit this to the
Board of Examiners?

A. Yes, because it was never completed.
Q.
Had the Golden Spikers signed this agreement, would
you have submitted it to the Board of Examiners?

A.

If paragraph 32 had been met.

Q.
What requirement was there in paragraph 32 that needed
to be met before the Golden Spikers signed the agreement?

A. First, Salt Lake City would not renew the business
license and, secondly, that the contract in existence witl
the Fairgrounds Speedway could be settled and done away
with. We couldn't lease the property to two people at
the same time.
Q.
Doesn't paragraph 32 solely shift the burden of any
loss resulting from the previous contract to the Golden
Spikers?

The Court: You are asking him for a legal conclusion, it
seems to me, Mr. McLachlin, and the context of the
paragraph speaks for itself as to what it does.
Q. (by Mr. McLachlin) Mr. Weilenmann, as a result of yo~
signing this agreement, the Utah Golden Spikers were permitted to install the soccer field; is that not correct?

A.

No.

Q.
Why were they permitted to install the soccer field
then?

A.
Because they had entered on the grounds, destroyed t~
speedway so the speedway couldn't operate, and counsel
advised that we could perhaps negotiate a contract that
would be satisfactory.
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A contract between whom?

A.

A contract between the State of Utah, that is the
Board of Examiners, and the Golden Spikers and the elimination of the contract that existed between the speedway
people and the State of Utah, which was then in force."
R. 122,123

Mr. Bringhurst testified in answer to the questions of Mr.
McLachlin with regard to Exhibit 1-P and the execution of an
agreement for the Golden Spikers as follows:
"A. Mr. Bringhurst, referring to Exhibit 1-P, does
your signature appear on Exhibit 1-P?
A.

Yes.

Q.

That is your signature on Exhibit 1-P?

A. Yes, that is only half a document, it has never been
processed ..• " R.l22
Q.

Do you know what Mr. Weilenmann did with the contract?

A.

It looks like he signed it.

Q.
Do you know what happened to the contract after Mr.
Weilenmann signed the contract?
A.

No.

Q. Do you know if the contract was ever submitted to the
Board of Examiners?

A.
No, I am not sure it wasn't.
I think if it had of
been, it would have been processed to the other process,
the Budget Director, the Finance Director and the other
things would have been approved first if it had been
submitted.
Q.
Do you have a copy in your possession that the Golden
Spikers signed?
A.

No ...

Q.
Isn't it a fact that the Golden Spikers signed this
agreement on March 31, the same time that you signed the
agreement?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A.

Not to my knowledge."

There was no witness that testified that the Budget
Director or the Director of Finance ever signed a contract
with the Golden Spikers.

No witness ever testified that

approval was given by the Board of Examiners as Mr. Weilenmann
testified would have to be the case.

No one testified that the
1

Golden Spikers ever signed the contract.
On this state of the record, it is outrageous to either
infer or claim a contract was entered into between the State
and the Golden Spikers.
2.

No contract should be "implied in fact."

Plaintiff claims on pages 12 and 13 of his Brief that a
contract should be implied in fact because a written agreement
was prepared even though not executed by the parties.
a.

Conditions precedent not met.

As Mr.

We~lenmann's

testimony shows, he advised the Golden Spiker representatives
that any agreement would have to be approved by the Board of
Examiners.

He made this a "condition precedent" to the agree-

ment to the state becoming bound.

It is hornbook law that a

condition precedent must be met.

See 17 AmJur Contracts §71.

The statutory requirements that the Budget Director and the
Director of Finance sign the agreement before the State is
bound are also conditions precedent which were never met.
b.

Contract negotiations continued.

t1r. Weilenmann',

testimony set out above also shows that contract negotiations
continued with the Golden Spikers long after Plaintiff had
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completed his work.

Such negotiations are inconsistent with

Plaintiff's claim that a contract could be implied in fact from
the actions of the parties.
c.

Statute of Frauds requires writing.

Paragraph

19 of Exhibit 1-P which provides for an initial lease term
of 5 years, brings the entire lease contract within the purview
of the Statute of Frauds, and is therefore required to be
in writing.
d.

Section 25-5-1,3 UCA 1953.
Reason for not submitting to Finance.

Plaintiff

infers the reason Mr. Weilenmann never presented the contract
to either the Budget Director, the Director of Finance, or
the Board of Examiners is because he thought the contract was
already operative.

A much more persuasive reason is that

given by Mr. Weilenmann.

The Golden Spikers never

ag~eed

to

or signed the contract and therefore, the contract was not
in form to be presented to the Budget Director, the Director
of Finance and the Board of Examiners.
e.

Request of permission to start. Plaintiff also

claims as evidence that a contract existed is the fact the
Spikers on or about the day Exhibit 1-P was signed asked Mr.
Bringhurst for something in writing so they could begin.

Mr.

Bringhurst told them "no" he was not authorized to give them
that permission"

R.l58.

The only reasonable conclusion is

that Mr. Bringhurst at this point in time did not believe there
was a contract and could not allow them to proceed until such
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The fact that the Golden

Spikers then immediately directed a contractor to break
the fence down and tear up part of the race track without
the knowledge of any of the officers of the State should
not be held against the State.
f.

Rice v Granite case.

On page 13 of Plaintiff's

Brief, he claims the State is estopped from denying the
existence of a contract between the State and the Golden
Spikers and in support thereof, cites the case of Rice v
Granite School District, 23 Ut.2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969).
In the Rice case, the action was for injuries sustained when
the Plaintiff, while attending a high school football game,
fell from a bleacher claimed to be negligently maintained
by the Defendant.

Defendant filed a motion to dismis? on

the grounds the Plaintiff's claim was barred by the one year
limitation period provided in the governmental immunity act.
Plaintiff filed an affidavit in opposition to Defendant's
motion.

The Court treated the matter as a motion for summary

judgment and dismissed the complaint with prejudice as not
being timely brought.

On appeal, the Plaintiff contended

that her affidavit contained sufficient facts to create an
estoppel which she was entitled to present to the jury.

The

facts claimed under the estoppel were that the insurance
adjuster who represented the insurance company for the high
school misled the Plaintiff by advising her she would be
compensated for her injury as soon as the costs were
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The Court held that the insurance carrier

held a peculiar status under the governmental immunity act
in that an insurance carrier is specifically authorized to
approve or deny a claim and therefor the acts of the insurance
carrier could bring about an estoppel.

The Court cautioned

against likening the results of the Rice case to a case like
we have presented here, where Mr. Bringhurst or Mr. Weilenmann,
as agents for the State, are not authorized by statute to
bind the State.

The Court makes this distinction in the

following language found on page 25:
"Implicit within the statutory designation of the
insurance carrier to deal directly with the claimant
is the acknowledgement that the insurance carrier's
conduct may be such as to support an estoppel.
The
insurance carrier is specifically authorized to approve
or deny claims; therefore, we are not confronted by a
fact situation wherein the agent's actions were not
authorized by statute and the governmental entity could
not be estopped to assert the statute of limitations."
The inference of the Rice case is that an agent of the State
who can bind the State can take the necessary action to create
an estoppel.

This is consistent with the overwhelming weight

of case authority as cited in the State's earlier Brief.
3.

More than lease agreement required.

Plaintiff on page 9 of his Brief claims advantage from
the fact that the Division of Expositions without approval of
t.he Director of Finance has authority to lease property of
the State Fair as provided by 64-4-7.5 UCA 1953.

Plaintiff's

position is not applicable to his needs nor supported by the
facts.
As earlier discussed, Mr. Weilenmann made approval of
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-12the Board of Examiners a condition precedent to the State
being bound and Exhibit 1-P itself makes clear it was to
be signed by both the Budget Director and the Director of
Finance and this certainly gave notice of the fact to the
Spikers, making this a condition precedent.

The evidence also

shows without contradiction that the Golden Spikers did not
execute the contract.

The fact that space was left for the

Spikers signature is evidence from which it can be concluded
a signature was necessary to manifest the Spikers were bound.
Further, the fact that Mr. Weilenmann testified many contract
drafts were prepared and negotiated after Exhibit 1-P was
signed by Mr. Bringhurst and Mr. Weilenmann shows neither
the Spikers nor the State intended to be bound by the terms
of Exhibit 1-P as Plaintiff contends.
If Exhibit 1-P is not considered as anything more than
a lease agreement as Plaintiff contends, which could be
properly executed by the Director of the Division of Expositions without approval of the Director of Finance, where
does the "award of a contract for improvements" which gives
rise to the application of the bonding statute come from?
If Plaintiff views the relationship oi Lhe State to the
Spikers as one of a lease only, then Plaintiff must look only
to the lease interest conveyed to the Golden Spikers onto whi~
he can attach his lien rights.

Plaintiff, of course, makes

no claim there are any rights presently owned by thP Spiker5
on which he can claim lien rights.
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Not Attorney General Recommendation.

On page 5, Plaintiff contends that the construction work
for installation of the soccer field was allowed to continue
on advice from the Attorney General's office.
unfair inference from the evidence.

This is an

Mr. Weilenmann testified

that it was the attorney's opinion that a contract could
be negotiated, and based on this opinion and "on his own,"
he determined to allow the work to continue.

R.ll5.

11r.

Bringhurst specifically testified that no one from the Attorney
General's office recommended that the Golden Spikers be
allowed to continue with the improvements or destruction of
the grandstand area. R.l90.
5.

No unauthorized expenditure claim.

Plaintiff makes an interesting, although inconsistent
argument on page 15 of his Brief.

Plaintiff states:

"In the instant case, there is absolutely no evidence
that the State of Utah was obligated to make expenditures
under its agreement with the Golden Spikers. To the
contrary, under its agreement with the Golden Spikers,
the State of Utah contemplated receiving an income had
its venture with the Golden Spikers been successful.
The judgment of the trial court does not represent
unauthorized expenditures for services and supplies, it
represents a liability imposed against the State of Utah
as a result of its failure to obtain the delivery of a
payment bond from the Golden Spikers as required by
Section 14-1-5, Utah Code Ann 1953 as amended."
If there was no "contract for the construction

of an

imrrovement" or no "contract amount" in ·Lhe contract claimed
hrtween the State and the Golden SpikerH, th8re is no application of the bond act and no bond required.

The bond act

by the S.J. Quinney
Law states:
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-14"Before any contract for the construction ... of ... any ...
improvement of the State of Utah ... is awarded to any
person, he shall furnish to the State of Utah ... bonds
which shall become binding upon the award of the contract to such person ...
(2) A payment bond in an amount to be fixed by the contracting body but in no event less than 50% of the contract amount ... provided for in such contract."
Clearly, the contract claimed by Plaintiff represents an expen- ·
diture by the State which was neither budgeted or approved as
required by law.
6.

Quantum l•1erui t Argument.

Plaintiff cites the case of Wilson v Salt Lake City, 52
Ut.506, 174 P.B47 as supporting his position.

The Wilson

case does not deal with the issues here presented.

The legis-

lature has set up exact procedures for expenditure of State
funds for improvements such as are claimed here.

These

include approval of the Budget Officer, the Finance Director
and calling for bids.

Salt Lake City had no such requirements.

This Court has never ruled on the issue presented in this case.,
7.

Conclusions.

Without supportive Findings or elaborating on the reasons,!
the trial court found the State liable under the bonding act
and for unjust enrichment.
Implicit to liability under the bonding statute is a
Finding there was a contract between the State through an
authorized agent representing the State, who followed State
requirements as the "owner" on the one hand, and the Golden
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-15Spikers as a "contractor" on the other hand, fixing a "contract
amount" for construction of the improvements specified, from
which contract amount the amount of the bond is fixed.

The

bonding statute is bottomed on the idea of agreement or
contract.

Without an agreement or contract, the bonding

statute does not apply.

No case is cited by Plaintiff finding

liability under any bonding statute based on "implied contract"
or any of the other equitable estoppel-like remedies.

These

equitable remedies do not operate through the bonding statute.
There is no evidence in this case that an

agreement was ever

reached so as to bring into play the bonding statute, through
which the Plaintiff, who contracted with the Golden Spikers,
can indirectly claim liability.
The evidence shows no contract should be

implied~in-fact

and this claim of Plaintiff should be rejected on the evidence.
Plaintiff's claim of unjust enrichment is not so easily
disposed of because this Court has never ruled on the underlying issues of law.
The State submits there are three issues raised in this
appeal that this Court should decide.
l.

Does a claim for unjust enrichment against

~he

State

fall within an exception to the Governmental Immunities Act?
2.

Can a claim for unjust enrichment, based on estoppel

because of acts of a State employee not authorized to bfnd the
State, supercede the express requirements of 63-2-l, 63-2-2
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-16and 64-1-4, requiring approval by the Budget Officer, the
Finance Director and appropriate bidding procedures?
3.

If unjust enrichment is allowed, is the measure of

damages the benefit to the State or the detriment to the
provider?
The answers to these questions are necessary not only
to decide this case, but also to determine the action the State
should take in other similar actions now pending as a result
of the State's involvement with the Golden Spikers.
The State submits that for the reasons given in its
first brief and in harmony with the overwhelming majority of
American Courts who have considered these issues, the Trial
Court should be reversed.

If the Plaintiff wishes to recapture

his fill material and top soil, the State has no objection.
Respectfully submitted,

vU~

~

Gc;Jb;~

lvilliam G.
I
Special Assistant Attorney Genera:!
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant !
State of Utah
I
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